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   Abstract
As storage costs drop, storage is becoming the lowest cost in a digital repository – and the biggest 
risk. We examine current modelling of costs and risks in digital preservation, concentrating on the 
Total  Cost  of  Risk when using digital  storage  systems  for  preserving audiovisual  material.  We 
review the vital role of storage and show how planning for long-term preservation of data should 
consider the risks involved in using digital storage technology. Gaps in information necessary for 
accurate  modelling  –  and  planning  –  are  presented.  We call  for  new  functionality  to  support 
recovery of files with errors, to eliminate the all-or-nothing approach of current IT systems, which 
in turn reduces the impact of failures of digital storage technology and  mitigates against loss of 
digital data1.
1  This article is based on the paper given by the authors at iPRES 2008; received May 2009, published 
December 2009.
The  International Journal of Digital Curation  is an international journal committed to scholarly excellence and 
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Significance of Storage
As storage costs continue to drop by roughly 50% every 18 months2, there are two 
effects:
• Storage looks free (but isn’t): the cost of storage devices becomes 
negligible, but power, space, cooling and management costs remain 
significant, especially in large data centres (Barroso & Holze, 2009).
• Storage is abundant: much more storage is used.
The following figure shows how hard drive storage has increased over the last 25 
years3.
Figure 1. Increase in capacity of hard drives over the last 20 years.
The largest available disk size (for a desktop computer) has increased from 5 MB 
to one terabyte – a factor of 200,000 (which is about 18 doublings in about 25 years, so 
very close to doubling every 18 months).
The “growth of risk” is of course much larger: a factor of 200 000 in disk size, 
times the increase in the usage of disks (about 10,000 over the same period (Lawson, 
2008)).
2 Wikipedia definition of Moore’s Law http://  en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moore's_law   
3
 Wikipedia (image source) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Hard_drive_capacity_over_time.png 
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This “growth of storage” also divides into two effects:
• the number of storage units increases(globally, and number used by any 
given institution)
• the amount of data stored on each unit also increases
The increase in storage units results in an ever increasing number of users being 
responsible for, or dependent upon, storage systems that have thousands of individual 
storage devices (hard drives, optical disks, data tapes). The increase in the amount of 
data stored on each device makes the failure of each device more significant in terms 
of the volume of data potentially lost. A 3.5” floppy disk with 1.4 megabytes (MB) of 
data represented a few dozen files. A 650 MB CD could hold 500 times more data: 
thousands of files, or one hour of audio. A USB-attached terabyte hard drive is 
700,000 times bigger than a floppy, and 1,400 times bigger than a CD. It could, for 
example, hold the entire contents of an institution’s audio collection (such as several 
years’ work by many people, collecting oral history recordings).
The increase in storage units (devices) means that statistics on failure rates that 
were once seen as “safe” are now appreciable risks. An advertised Mean Time 
Between Failure of 1,000 years looks very safe to a person buying a new hard drive 
(though it will be obsolete in five years). Schroeder and Gibson (2007) give results on 
a survey of major datacentres holding 100,000 disks, and found annual failure rates 
ranging from one to 13 %, averaging around 3% - far higher than an MTBF of 1,000 
years. Similar results have been seen in other large scale applications of hard drive 
storage, for example, Pinheiro, Weber & Barosso (2007).  This failure rate means that 
owners of a thousand of those same hard drives will need systems (e.g., big RAID 
arrays) and processes (e.g., continual hot-swapping and rebuilding) to ensure these 
failures are managed.
But it does not stop here.  There is a widespread assumption that mass storage 
technology, e.g., RAID disk and offsite tape backup, solves the problem of failures in 
storage units. The reality is that data corruption or loss can be caused by failures in 
hardware, bugs in software, and human errors at all levels.  Worse still, this corruption 
can happen without detection or correction.  These are the so called ‘latent’ or ‘silent’ 
errors as described by Baker et al. (2006) and Rosenthal (2008).
Field studies of large disk-based systems, for example, Keleman (2007) and Jiang, 
Hu and Zhou (2008), reveal endemic silent data corruption in hard drive storage, 
including in ‘enterprise class’ systems that are explicitly designed to prevent data loss. 
In the CERN study reported by Keleman, as much as 1 bit in every 109 was on average 
irreversibly corrupted. Errors occured in the very systems, e.g., RAID controllers, that 
are designed to mitigate against failures lower down in the stack, and to protect against 
bit or sector level errors on hard drives.
The implication is clear.  Any organisation using mass storage systems with a 
requirement for long-term data integrity should employ an ongoing and proactive 
programme of data-integrity checking and repair at an end-to-end systems level.  It 
should not be assumed that any component of the system (networks, storage, memory, 
processing) is somehow ‘safe’, that is, immune from failures and data corruption 
problems.
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Cost Modelling
We present an approach to risk that combines the dimensions of cost, risk 
(uncertainty) and value (benefits). This model builds upon and extends work on cost 
modelling by both the digital library and audiovisual communities. Early on in the 
development of digital libraries there was the fundamental work on preservation 
strategies by Beagrie and Greenstein (1998), Hendley (1998), Granger, Russell and 
Weinberger (2000) – and eventually something about the audiovisual sector from EU 
PRESTO project (Wright, 2002). The state of the art was brought together, and 
specifically labelled “life cycle”, in the important paper of Shenton (2003).
Since then, there have been entire projects and conferences devoted to life-cycle  
models and costs.  At a conference organised by the Digital Preservation Coalition and 
the Digital Curation Centre (DPC/DCC, 2005) there were reports from the LIFE4 and 
eSPIDA5 projects, both specifically about costs, though the eSPIDA work was more 
generally concerned with a formal method for including intangible benefits (value) in 
business cases.  More pertinent to the present paper, it also specifically introduced the 
issue of uncertainty into the modelling process. Cost and value models are only one 
part of the wider activity of economic modelling, which in turn is just part of achieving 
sustainable digital preservation and access.  Details and examples can be found in the 
Blue Ribbon Task Force (2008) interim report in this area.
Specific digital library and digital preservation cost models reported at the 2005 
DPC/DCC conference included work from Cornell University, The National Archive 
in the UK, and the Koninklijke Bibliotheek in the Netherlands as well as two papers 
arising from PrestoSpace6.  In all these models and studies, and for digital library 
technology in general, little is said about storage (except in the PrestoSpace work). 
Digital libraries assume that storage will be there (somewhere), and will work and 
continue to work.  In estimating Total Cost of Ownership (TCO), the complexity of the 
models just mentioned is devoted to digital library processes, not storage devices (or 
their management). In digital library/repository TCO models, storage cost is generally 
modelled as a single number per year, and the model simply “adds up” those numbers.
We hope that current work in preservation theory and methodology, with use of 
file-description metadata, will support and encourage the ability of storage systems to 
return less-than-perfect files in a usable fashion.  Examples of work with relevance to 
file description include Planets (file characterization) and Shaman:
• MPEG-21 DIDL7 = Digital Item Declaration Language
• Planets XCEL, XCDL = eXtensible Characterisation Languages (Becker, 
Rauber, Heydegger, Schnasse & Thaller, (2008); Thaller, (2008))
• Shaman = multivalent approach (Watry, 2007)
4 LIFE http://  www.life.ac.uk/  
5 espida http://  www.gla.ac.uk/espida/  
6
 PrestoSpace  http://www.prestospace.eu; http://digitalpreservation.ssl.co.uk/index.html
7 Cover Pages http://  xml.coverpages.org/mpeg21-didl.html  
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Cost-of-Risk Modelling
Estimation of cost involves uncertainties.  Some uncertainties can be represented 
as variances in cost estimates (uncertainty about how much costs may vary from the 
predicted value), but a whole range of uncertainties are related to things that may or 
may not happen, and should be formally identified as risks.
A risk is the likelihood of an incident along with the business consequences 
(positive or negative) (Addis, 2008).
Examples of possible incidents that put content at risk include:
• Technical obsolescence, e.g., formats and players
• Hardware failures, e.g., digital storage systems
• Loss of staff, e.g., skilled transfer operators
• Insufficient budget, e.g., digitisation too expensive
• Accidental loss, e.g., human error during QC
• Stakeholder changes, e.g., preservation no longer a priority
• Underestimation of resources or effort
• Fire, flood, meteors
Traditional risk modelling8 (and its use in project management) looks at lists of 
such incidents, and their attendant likelihoods (assessing likelihood may have the 
largest uncertainty of the whole process!) as contained in a risk register, and then 
proceeds to predict the consequences – the impact – of each item.
Possible consequences for preservation from the above list of incidents would 
include:
• Corruption or loss of audiovisual content
• Interruption to services
• Inefficiencies and increased costs
• Corner cutting and increased risks
• Failure to meet legal obligations
• Loss of reputation or loss of customers
A more comprehensive approach to the whole issue of uncertainty in preservation 
is to include the concept of value (benefit).  The work of eSPIDA has already been 
mentioned.
8
 Risk definition and risk management: JISC:  http://  www.jiscinfonet.ac.uk/InfoKits/risk-management/   
PRINCE2:  http://  www.ogc.gov.uk/methods_prince_2.asp  
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Figure 2. Interplay of costs, uncertainties (risks) and benefits (value) when planning 
preservation.
The combination of uncertainty, cost and benefits forms a three-way interaction, 
as shown in Figure 2. The key point about this approach is that applies to the whole 
issue of business-case planning, not just to the more narrow issues of risk analysis and 
cost modelling.
A typical preservation scenario, which can be optimized by use of the cost-of-risk 
approach, is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Workflow model for digitisation of analogue auidovisual material.
This shows a triage applied to items entering a workflow, so that items with a low 
risk of problems go through a low-cost workflow, while high-risk and high-value items 
go through a more comprehensive – and therefore expensive – workflow.   The red 
arrow marked exception handling shows a response to an error: a low risk item fails in 
the simple workflow path A1, A2, A3, and so is shuttled back to the alternate workflow 
B1, B2.  The proportion of items going through the various branches determines the 
overall cost – which rises if there is an unforeseen high level of exceptions (Addis & 
Veres, 2007).  All the knowledge about risks, probabilities, costs and values – and 
what to do about them – can be combined in such a workflow.  This form of process 
modelling allows overall costs to be estimated, and detailed simulations also allow 
time and effort to be estimated (to within the accuracy of the parameters of the model).
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This integrated approach to cost, risk and value allows all the factors affecting 
preservation planning, funding and management to be considered in one set of 
interactions, rather than being taken separately.  For quantitative modelling, all three 
factors need to be converted to a common unit of measurement. As cost and benefits 
are already commonly thought of in financial terms, the task is then to also express the 
uncertainties in monetary units: the cost-of-risk.
Full details require a much longer presentation.  The essential issue for a 
quantitative approach to costs, benefits and risks is to have a common unit of 
measurement that allows direct comparison and hence proper evaluation of trade-offs. 
Standard practice in project management divides risk probabilities and impacts into 
two (high vs. low) or at most three categories (high, mid, low).  However, an actual 
number is needed for the probability of occurrence of a risk, and a cost (if money is to 
be the metric unit) of the potential impact.  How such costs can be assigned is entirely 
dependent on the situation.  From a risk perspective, there has already been a great deal 
of detailed work specifically relevant to preservation in the DRAMBORA9 project. 
This includes example risks that surround the long-term storage of digital content, with 
some examples shown below of how these might be interpreted for audiovisual 
preservation.
DRAMBORA 
Risk ID
Title10 Example 
R30 Hardware Failure A storage system corrupts files (bit rot) or loses data due to 
component failures (e.g., hard drives).
R31 Software Failure A software upgrade to the system looses or corrupts the 
index used to locate files.
R32 Systems fail to meet 
archive needs
The system can’t cope with the data volumes and the 
backups fail. 
R33 Obsolescence of 
hardware or software
A manufacturer stops support for a tape drive and there is 
insufficient head life left in existing drives owned by the 
archive to allow migration
R34 Media degradation or 
obsolescence
The BluRay optical discs used to store XDCAM files 
develop data loss.
R35-R38 Security Insufficient security measures allow unauthorised access 
that results undetected modification of files.
R39 Disasters All content is in a small space through use of high density 
storage systems (e.g., tape robot) which makes the archive 
vulnerable to large-scale loss in a fire or flood.
R40 Accidental System 
Disruption
An operator accidentally deletes one or more files.
R55, 56, 59 Loss of integrity or 
authenticity
There is no audit trail for the changes made to content, 
which mean preservation actions are not taken or are 
inappropriate.
R60 Unsuitable backups The backup tapes can’t be read.
R61 Inconsistent copies There are two copies of the content but they are different 
due to corruption of one of them, but which one is correct 
can’t be identified.
R64, R69 Content Identifiers The identifier used to locate a particular file in the system 
is lost or corrupted.
Table 1. Example DRAMBORA risks.
9 DRAMBORA http://www.repositoryaudit.eu/
10 In some cases the title has been shortened or paraphrased to make it easier to understand.
The International Journal of Digital Curation
Issue 3, Volume 4 | 2009
111   Richard Wright et al
These risks can then be quantified using an estimate of the frequency of their 
occurrence, by using, for example, the DRAMBORA likelihood rating from 1 to 611 
based on statistics from the literature or experience, e.g., on data corruption rates seen 
in storage systems as described earlier in this paper.  In this way, methodologies such 
as DRAMBORA can be applied to relatively specific areas such as media failures or 
loss of individual files.
From a preservation cost perspective, there are some examples in the Blue Ribbon 
Task Force interim report and further specific costs for audiovisual preservation in 
Addis (2008).  Various case studies exist with comprehensive cost breakdowns, for 
example the National Archives (Riksarkivet, RA) in Stockholm as described in Palm 
(2006).  The recent and extensive Google report on Web Scale Computing also 
provides details of cost-modelling for large-scale storage and processing 
infrastructures (Barroso & Holze, 2009).  This including the cost of mitigating against 
failures of all the components of these infrastructures.
Figure 4 shows consideration of risk as the central metaphor in strategic planning.
Figure 4. Risk Management Process (reproduced from ‘A Risk Management Standard’ 
by the Institute of Risk Management12).
11 1=Once in a hundred years or less often, 2=Once in ten years, 3=Once in 5 years, 4=Once a year, 5= 
Once a Month, 6=More than once a month
12 The Institute of Risk Management http://www.theirm.org/publications/PUstandard.html
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Cost of Risk and Mitigation of Loss
The effort within the digital library community to define and construct trusted 
digital repositories pays little attention to storage. The trust issue is typically defined 
and examined mainly at the institutional level, with less emphasis placed at the level of 
IT systems or individual device or file failures.  DRAMBORA and TRAC correctly 
take an holistic approach to trust, but to be used effectively it is essential to go down to 
the detail of storage.  The only physical reality of the content of a trusted digital 
repository consists of files which of necessity exist on some form of storage.The 
“atomic level” of success or failure of a repository is the success or failure of an 
attempt to read individual files. Such success or failure is clearly fundamental to the 
concept of trust for the whole repository.
Effort by those working in the storage area of the IT industry is focused on 
reducing the likelihood of read errors (device failure or file-read error). There is no 
concept, within standard IT systems, of a built-in and simple-to-use approach that 
provides access to partially-recoverable files13. If the inevitable low-level errors cannot 
be corrected by the built-in error detection and correction technology, the read fails 
and the file fails to open. Worse still are cases where the storage system then interprets 
the error as a fault with the media, e.g., a data tape labels it as such, and then 
stubbornly refuses any further attempts to read that media or any of the files on it. 
This happens when the system safeguards itself, for example, protecting tape heads 
from being damaged by faulty tape, but it can be at the expense of not maximising 
retrieval of the data in that system.
There is nothing that the ordinary user can do at this point, and even the all-
powerful system manager can only look at backups to see if there is another copy of 
exactly the same file.  This is not to say that there is no way to access what is left of 
the file.  There is technology14 to attempt to read corrupted files or failed hard drives, 
but such technology falls in the category of heroic measures: e.g., requiring special 
skills, a lot of time or sending the file or drive to an external company that will attempt 
a recovery using proprietary technology, at a substantial price15.
Physically, a file with a read error is not an all-or-nothing situation.  There will 
still be a stream of data (somewhere in the stack of operations between the user and the 
hardware) which is likely to be mainly correct, and is also likely to even have 
indications of which bytes are incorrect (because of lateral parity errors). For simple 
error detection and correction schemes, a common situation underlying an inability to 
read a file is a single block of data that has two or more such errors, so that the 
longitudinal parity check is ambiguous. At that point, a whole file of many blocks of 
data is called unreadable, because two bytes – at known locations – fail their parity 
check and so are known to be erroneous.
13 This statement is based on the long term computing experience of the authors, communications with 
colleagues and general knowledge of computer operating systems and storage management.  For 
example, a search of the 48 tutorials about storage on the SNIA (Storage Networking Industry 
Association). website found no mention of partial recovery or indeed any form of recovery from file 
read-errors. http://www.snia.org/education/tutorials/2009/fall/
14 For example, File Recoverer from PCTools http://www.pctools.com/file-recover/  or ddrescue from 
GNU http://www.gnu.org/software/ddrescue/ddrescue.html .  Operating systems also include repair 
tools, e.g. to fix corruption of files or filesystems, such as fsck, chkdsk.  The problem is that none of 
these are easy to use at the scale of data often seen in digital preservation projects.
15 Recovery tool box http://www.recoverytoolbox.com/  This company is just one of many offering tools 
that may be able to repair a corrupted file.
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Returning to the definition of risk as having two factors: probability and impact: 
the ability to read most of the data in a corrupted file would, in certain cases, greatly 
reduce the impact of the error.  This is the area of risk reduction that is being examined 
by the UK project AVATAR16 (Addis et al, 2008). AVATAR is also looking at the 
whole issue of optimization and management of storage, from the perspective of 
archiving and long-term preservation.
Reducing the impact of a storage failure is a method for mitigation of loss 
(Knight, 2007). The issue of loss and recovery from loss has been identified as a 
neglected area in digital-preservation thinking, but its importance has been highlighted 
by the growing awareness of the phenomenon of bit rot (Panzer-Steindel, 2007).
Despite the best efforts of the IT industry, despite mean time between failure of 
hard drives exceeding one million hours, and despite tests of storage functionality 
yielding read-error estimations of one failure in 1017 read attempts – errors do occur. 
The first author was, in 2008, personally experiencing one file-read failure per month – 
and in each case these are total failures, with no possibility of mitigation (beyond the 
commercial route of heroic measures).  Large data centres have now begun to publish 
data on errors, including the report from CERN mentioned earlier that showed bit-rot 
levels affecting up to 1 byte in 3x107 (Panzer-Steindel, 2007), meaning one error in 30 
megabytes of data.  At the file level, one file in 1,500 was affected.
Redundancy and Risk.
Standard practice for reducing risk of loss is to have another copy.  The use of 
second (or higher) copies is a method of reducing impact: a file-read error or a device 
failure has much less impact if recourse can be made to a backup copy or system.
At a more sophisticated level, arrays of hard drives are used to gain the benefits of 
redundancy at lower cost. RAID17 technology achieves protection for the loss of one of 
N drives in a set of N+1 – so the net cost is N+1 drives, rather than the 2N that would 
be required by simple redundancy.  RAID has now advanced (e.g., RAID6) to the 
point where multiple disks can fail without data loss, which means data can still be 
accessed safely whilst individual disks are being replaced and live rebuilding takes 
place. This allows disk systems to be built that are resilient to hardware failures and 
data read errors. For large data centres, the problem is shifted, to some extent, from 
risk of loss from device failure to having the right support processes to “feed” large 
systems with a constant supply of new drives and have the people in place to do so.
Whilst RAID can mitigate against detected failures, it does not solve the problem 
of ‘silent’ errors.  Indeed, if there are additional errors in the software or firmware used 
to implement RAID, then this can actually make the problem worse.  Neither does the 
use of RAID avoid the need for multiple copies in more than one geographic location 
to mitigate against catastrophic loss scenarios, e.g., fire or flood in a data centre. 
However, many copies of the content in many places can result in prohibitive costs. 
For example, in the audiovisual domain, Standard Definition digital video has an 
uncompressed data rate of about 200 MBit/s and even when stored with compression, 
e.g., 50MBit/s DV, this means that multiple Petabytes of storage are required for a 
16 AVATAR-m: http://www.it-innovation.soton.ac.uk/projects/avatar-m/ 
17 RAID: Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks – an efficient method of achieving device-level 
redundancy. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Redundant_array_of_independent_disks 
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typical broadcast archive. HD requires five times as much space.  In digital cinema, 
scanning or creating images at 4K resolution requires up to 30 times the data rate of 
SD. For 3D cinema with twin data streams at up to 144 fps the volumes are truly vast. 
This size presents a real problem.  Estimates are that it costs $1.5M per annum for 1PB 
of storage using online disks, with the cost of tape (in robots) being approximately a 
third of this (Moore, D’Aoust, McDonald & Minor, 2007).   Multiple copies (more 
than two) can mean unacceptable costs at this scale. When considering the cost of 
storage it is important to consider how the cost is broken down, e.g., between 
equipment, maintenance, space, power and cooling etc., and how these factors are 
dependent on each other.  Both Moore et al. (2007) and Barroso and Holze (2009) 
provide example breakdowns for large-scale storage operations.  Over half the cost can 
be made up of staff, utilities and space.  Lowering these costs, either by relocating 
storage to where these elements are cheaper or by choosing a different type of storage 
technology can alter the probability of loss.  As an extreme example, data tapes on 
shelves can achieve high densities with a naturally low power requirement.  However, 
unless they are checked and migrated regularly, which introduces a further labour and 
equipment cost, then the increased probability of data loss can negate the initial 
savings compared to using tape robots or other automated mass storage systems.
At the same time as redundancy is added to storage systems to reduce risk, 
redundancy is being taken out of the files stored on those systems, as a way to save 
space. Compression, lossless or lossy, is based on the innate redundancy (entropy) of 
the original data.  When the redundancy is removed from a file, a complex 
transformation has to be applied to the resulting data in order to transform it back to 
the original (or close to the original, in the case of lossy compression).
To Encode Or Not To Encode.
Not encoding, in particular not using compression, typically results in files that 
have minimal sensitivity to corruption.  In this way, the choice not to use compression 
is a way to mitigate against loss.
As an example, consider uncompressed audio.  A .WAV file is simply a header 
followed by a sequence of numbers – one number per sample of the desired audio 
waveform. If the audio is sampled at 44.1 kHz (the rate used on CDs), each sample 
represents about 23 micro-seconds of data. Losing one byte of data results in one bad 
sample, but there is no spread to any of the rest of the data.
Hence an uncompressed audio file can be perfectly usable despite loss of one 
byte. Indeed, experiments have shown18 that a .WAV file with 0.4% errors is almost 
undistinguishable from the original, whereas an MP3 file with the same level of errors 
either will not open at all, or will have errors affecting most of the audio, and rendering 
it unusable.  The same logic applies to video, images – and even to text if represented 
as a sequence of characters  (with embedded mark-up, as in the old days of “printer 
control characters” as escape sequences within a text “stream”).
Using compression, be it lossless or lossy, can save on storage space, and in turn 
allow more copies to be held for the same cost. However, compression can make the 
files much more sensitive to data corruption. The CERN study (Panzer-Steindel, 2007 
p.3) found that a single bit error would make a compressed file unreadable, with a 
18 First author’s own experiments, unpublished
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probability of 99.8%.  The same applies to the use of content-specific compression, 
e.g., image or video compression for media files.  For example, Heydegger (2008) 
developed a ‘robustness indicator’ on the sensitivity of image formats to bit level 
corruption and then investigated how compression affects robustness.  This work is 
notable as it includes JPEG2000, which is emerging as a strong candidate for 
preservation in the AV community (Pearson & Gill, 2005) including digital cinema19. 
Tests by Heydegger showed that corrupting only 0.01% of the bytes in a compressed 
JPEG2000 file, including lossless compression, could result in at least 50% of the 
original information encoded in the file being affected.  In some cases, corrupting just 
a single byte in a JPEG2000 image would cause highly visible artefacts throughout the 
whole of that image.
This sensitivity to corruption is traded for a saving in storage space, although the 
trade-off is not always simply one for the other. For example, Heydegger found that 
one byte of corruption had the following effect:
• a 10 MB uncompressed TIFF file had just .00001% errors (meaning just 
that one byte was affected)
• a lossless JPEG2000 file had 17% errors for a saving of 27% in storage
• a lossy JPEG2000 file had 2.1% errors for a saving of 62% in storage
As an example of the affect of data loss on image files, here are two examples: a 
BMP file (uncompressed) and a GIF file (compressed). The BMP file has 1,400 errors, 
one in every 256 bytes. The GIF file has a single error 
Figure 5.  BMP file with one error per 256 bytes (1,400 errors).
19 Enhanced Digital Cinema project (EDCINE) http://www.edcine.org/intro/
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Figure 6.  GIF file with a single error (in 14 KB).
From the above results, it is evident that removing redundancy through 
compression increases impact of corruption, i.e., the “cost of error”. The compression 
increases the proportional damage caused by an unrecoverable read error. However, if 
there is no mechanism for using files despite read errors, then it is of no practical 
significance whether a one-byte error causes major damage, or only very local and 
minor damage. If the file cannot be read in either case, the error-magnification factor 
caused by compression is hidden.
If less-than-perfect files can be passed back to the user, or to a file-restoration 
application, then the increase in “cost of error” caused by compression can be 
legitimately compared with the decrease in cost of storage.  As the cost of storage 
devices reduces, and as storage management improves in efficiency, preservation 
strategies based solely or largely on storage costs are less and less satisfactory.
An unsolved issue in preservation strategy is whether it is better (lower “cost of 
risk” for the same or less total risk) to use lossless compression and then make 
multiple copies (externalized redundancy) as a way to reduce the impact of storage 
errors – or to avoid compression and exploit the internal redundancy of the files.  The 
problem at present is that there is little or no technology (within conventional storage 
systems, or conventional digital repositories) to support the second option.
It is also possible to encode files in a way that deliberately increases their 
robustness to corruption, JPEG2000 wireless (JPWL) being an example20. 
Redundancy and error checking are built in to improve robustness to errors introduced 
during transmission over wireless channels.  However, whilst this approach, and 
20 JPEG 2000 http://www.jpeg.org/jpeg2000/j2kpart11.html
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source/channel coding more generally21, is used for robust transmission through space, 
i.e., from one geographical location to another, it has yet to be applied to long-term 
transmission through time where the channel is the storage system and noise is 
introduced by that channel, e.g., silent corruptions.
Either way, the results of Heydegger combined with the ‘bit rot’ headline findings 
of NetApp or CERN would imply that maintaining integrity of very large files is 
nearly impossible.  For example, if the bit corruption rates of 10-9 reported in the 
CERN study occurred in the audiovisual domain, then for data files that are 1013 bits in 
size (approx 1TB, which is an hour of uncompressed HD), it would seem inevitable 
that these files will become corrupted quite rapidly when stored on disk.  Yet this is 
not the case.  The headline figures reported, whilst attention grabbing, neglect the 
distribution of the corruption.  Studies show that corruption is typically at the block 
level rather than bit level, it tends to be spatially correlated, e.g., successive blocks on 
a disk are more likely to be corrupted than blocks at random, and it affects media in 
batches (e.g., a bad batch of hard drives from a particular manufacturer) (Barroso & 
Holze, 2009; Krioukov et al, 2008;).  This is why corruption of large files exists, but is 
not endemic.  Further studies are needed on how this pattern of corruption files 
translates to loss of content.
The question of which strategy to take depends upon more than just the ability of 
file systems to return files with partial errors. An holistic approach to risk management 
means dealing with disaster recovery (fire, flood, theft, etc.), human error (accidental 
corruption, deletion, miscataloguing, etc.), and technology obsolescence (formats, 
software, devices, etc.). All these risks provide a strong motivation for having multiple 
copies in multiple places using multiple technical solutions. If an offsite copy of 
uncompressed video is created to address disaster recovery, then lossless compression 
may allow two offsite copies for the same cost. Three copies in three places may well 
be enough to reduce the risk of loss due to individual storage failures to a level where 
no further measures are needed beyond those of conventional storage systems, e.g., 
RAID.  However, this has yet to be proven and is unlikely to apply in all 
circumstances.
Given so many options (to compress or not to compress; how many copies to 
make; if, how and when to detect and repair corruption etc.), there is a need for new 
frameworks that allow the multitude of strategies to be compared and implemented. 
Both AVATAR-m (Addis 2008, Addis, Lowe & Middleton, 2009) and PrestoPrime22 
have started work in this area.  Whilst only tackling subsets of the overall cost of risk 
of loss problem, they do recognise that a ‘one size fits all’ approach is unlikely to 
succeed and hence they focus on how to provide a way for various strategies to be 
evaluated and combined.
The right approach is not just one of finding the best technical solution.  It is also 
a question of finding an approach that is in itself easy to understand and is amenable to 
risk assessment and management.  As stated earlier, no part of the system should be 
considered infallible, including those parts responsible for error correction. For 
example, consider the use of erasure-coding23 techniques in wide-area storage 
21 Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_theory
22 PrestoPRIME http://www.prestoprime.org/
23 Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erasure_coding
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networks, for example, clouds, for example, as used by Permabit24. The erasure code 
introduces redundancy that mitigates failures in the individual storage nodes.  If there 
are many such nodes then an erasure code can be much more efficient than brute force 
replication (Weatherspoon & Kubiatowicz, 2002). On the other hand, encoding and 
distributing a file in this way means that there is no way to recover any of that file if 
the ‘index’ is lost that describes how the encoding and distribution has been done.  The 
software/system/vendor becomes the risk rather than the storage, i.e., one danger has 
been, to some extent, traded for another.
Despite various techniques being available, it is not until file-reading systems are 
willing and able to return files despite errors, and include media-specific 
reconstruction techniques to “fill in” where errors are known to exist, that there will be 
an effective way to exploit file-error recovery as a method to mitigate against loss. 
This gap currently prevents a whole class of “cost of risk” strategies from being used 
to complement conventional techniques.
The frustration for audiovisual archivists is that digital technology has taken us 
one step forward, and now is taking us two steps back. The ability of analogue 
videotape recorders to cope with loss of data (dropout) was limited, and black lines 
would appear in the resultant images. Digital tape recorders had much better built-in 
compensation: the concealment option would allow a missing line to be replaced by a 
neighbouring line, and expensive machines could even replace entire frames with an 
adjacent (in time) frame. Now file-based digital technology has no ability to cope with 
loss (corruption; uncorrectable errors), beyond the “external redundancy” option of 
multiple copies.
One could accept that files will remain “all-or-nothing” entities – you either get 
everything in them or you lose the lot. The strategy then becomes one of splitting 
assets, e.g., a video sequence, into multiple files and implementing data integrity 
measures at the application level, currently being investigated in the AVATAR project 
(Addis et al, 2009). For example, an audiovisual program could be split into separate 
files for shots, scenes, frames, regions of interest, audio, video or many other ways. 
The most important parts would then be assigned to one or more storage systems with 
appropriate levels of reliability – avoiding the “all eggs in one basket” problem. An 
asset can be separated into pieces based on knowledge of the importance, to the user, 
of the various parts of the content – knowledge that a file system or storage device will 
never have. The disadvantage is increased technology and management costs, which 
introduces complexity and new risks – both are a violation of the “simplest is best” 
principle.
Conclusions
Comprehensive and integrated planning for preservation can be accomplished 
through the use of a three-factor model, based on costs, benefits and uncertainties. The 
cost-of-risk concept allows all three factors to be quantified on a common, monetary 
scale.
24 Permabit Technology Corporation http://www.permabit.com/
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When considering how best to store files with some assurance of long-term 
integrity, the choices are complex and include how many copies to use, how to encode 
them, where to store them, how frequently to check them, how to repair them 
efficiently, and how to do all this in a cost-effective way.  
There is no single answer, rather a range of options where the “best” one in a 
given context will change over time.  This calls for new frameworks that allows these 
choices to be quantified, compared, assessed and implemented to suit the differing 
needs of archives, including their budgets and appetite for risk.
Starting with a simple strategy is frequently the best approach.  One way to reduce 
the cost of risk, and hence the best chance for mitigation of loss, is simply not to 
compress the data.  Storing only uncompressed data would appear to add cost rather 
than reduce it – but storage costs are typically a small part of a preservation project or 
strategy (labour is always the dominant cost), and storage media cost is dropping by 
50% every 18 months.
But the full benefit of uncompressed files (in terms of mitigation of loss and 
consequent reduction of impact) will remain irrelevant unless and until the storage 
industry and digital repository architects produce systems that allow access to less than 
perfect files.
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